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Abstract 
 
The paper’s purpose is to address the economic, institutional, and legal issues confronting 
the establishment of a more centralised approach to EU securities regulation and to 
suggest that the theory of optimum currency areas can be used as a model to assess the 
economic benefits and costs of further centralisation of securities regulation in the 
European Union. The European Union’s Financial Services Action Plan seeks to achieve 
an integrated market in financial services in order to accomplish the economic and 
political objectives of the Treaty of Rome. The FSAP is premised on the notion that the 
adoption of legal and regulatory measures to achieve liberalisation in cross-border trade 
in financial services will also achieve integration of EU financial markets. This paper 
argues that liberalisation of financial markets does not necessarily lead to integration of 
financial markets. Furthermore, it argues that the institutional design and scope of 
financial regulation should be based, in part, on the extent of integration in the financial 
market. That is, the domain of the regulator should be the same as the domain of the 
market. European capital and financial markets remain fragmented and segmented. This 
paper argues therefore that, until EU financial markets become more integrated, a single 
EU securities regulator would not be an efficient or effective institutional model for EU 
securities markets. In other words, at present, the EU is not an optimal economic area for 
a single securities regulator.  
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Introduction  
 
For forms of Government let fools contest 
Whatever is best administered is best 
Alexander Pope 
 
European financial markets are rapidly evolving in response to the forces of 
technological change, deregulation and liberalisation.  They remain fragmented and 
segmented in many areas, however.  Although interest rate differentials have 
substantially converged in the interbank markets, the capital markets remain essentially 
segmented within national jurisdictions, whilst very little cross-border activity takes place 
in corporate loans and in banking services.  The composition of most investment funds is 
substantially biased towards home markets.  Although some of the fragmentation may be 
attributed to regulatory obstacles and legal barriers, the major causes have more to do 
with macroeconomic, social and cultural factors.  For instance, differences in the risk 
appetite of investors across jurisdictions affect the types of investment products offered, 
whilst market imperfections often result in major obstacles to the efficient flow of capital 
throughout the EU.  This paper argues that the market structure factors are largely 
independent of the regulatory and legal barriers that are generally viewed as the major 
obstacles to achieving a single EU market in financial services.   
The role of EU institutions in regulating financial markets is also undergoing 
significant change, as various legislative and institutional initiatives have rapidly changed 
the European Union’s regulatory structure for monetary policy, payment systems, and 
financial services.  For example, the European Central Bank exercises primary authority 
over monetary policy and payment system regulation in the eurozone and is accountable 
 4
to EU finance ministers and the Parliament.1  In investment services and securities, the 
Lamfalussy Committee’s recommendations were recognised by the Council of Ministers’ 
Stockholm Resolution of March 20012 as providing a programme that creates a new four-
level consolidated regulatory approach to make the EU securities legislation process 
more efficient, flexible, and transparent.3  The European Union’s Financial Services 
Action Plan (‘FSAP’) has recognised the Lamfalussy programme as an essential element 
to achieving the EU Treaty objectives of an internal market for capital movement and 
trade in financial services.4  The Lamfalussy programme is essentially a regulatory 
process that relies on existing comitology procedures as set forth in Article 202 of the 
Treaty of Rome to develop EU securities legislation based on proposals from national 
finance ministers and regulators and in consultation with industry.   
The institutional structure of the Lamfalussy programme has been criticised as 
being too slow and subject to protectionist influences from national authorities.5  It is 
argued that these weaknesses are obstacles to achieving the objectives of the EU 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), thereby justifying the creation of a single EU 
securities regulator.  This paper argues that advocates of increased centralisation of EU 
securities regulation have not given adequate thought as to whether EU economies 
(including accession country economies) have achieved sufficient levels of convergence 
and integration in their financial market structures and practices to justify increased 
centralisation and consolidation of securities regulation at the EU level.  Indeed, the lack 
of integration between EU financial markets, especially in equities and retail financial 
services, suggests that the European Union (including the accession countries) may not 
be an optimal economic area for a single securities regulator.  This paper builds on 
previous research to argue that the institutional design and scope of a financial regulator 
should depend, in part, on the extent of integration in the financial market over which it 
regulates.  In other words, the domain of the regulator should be the same as the domain 
of the market. 6  The domain of a financial market can be determined, in part, by its 
degree of integration.   
This paper draws on preliminary financial market data to suggest that the lack of 
integration in EU securities markets militates against further centralisation and 
consolidation of the institutional structure of EU securities and investment services 
 5
regulation.  In fact, more prosaically, the paper asserts that the low level of integration in 
most areas of EU financial and investment services markets suggests that the EU may not 
be an optimal economic area for a single securities regulator.7  Any final conclusions 
regarding the extent of financial integration will remain preliminary until further research 
has been undertaken to measure, in a more precise manner, the actual degree of financial 
integration in the European Union.8  The paper also attempts to undermine one of the 
major premises of the EU FSAP, which is that there is a necessary relationship between 
the degree of liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation in financial markets and the 
degree of integration of those markets.  The EU FSAP presumes that by reducing or 
eliminating regulatory and legal barriers to cross-border trade in financial services that 
financial market integration will logically follow.  The FSAP approach, however, fails to 
make the important distinction between the creation of a liberalised framework of 
financial regulation and the creation of truly integrated financial markets.  Similarly, 
those advocates of a single securities regulator have also failed to address this problem of 
distinguishing between integration and liberalisation and the implication of this for the 
success of EU regulatory integration programmes. 
Notwithstanding the lack of integration in EU financial markets, the ultimate 
objectives of the EU Treaties to create a seamless internal market for trade in goods, 
services, and capital requires a certain degree of EU regulatory authority both in terms of 
institutional design and in harmonised standards and principles.  Indeed, the institutional 
design of financial regulation should be flexible and always responsive to developments 
in financial markets.  At the present stage of EU financial development, EU regulatory 
authorities should be involved in devising high-level principles that should take account 
of national differences in segmented EU financial markets.  Indeed, the paper suggests 
that broad principles devised at the EU level should be implemented by national 
authorities who would adopt national rules that respect the economic, institutional, and 
legal differences between EU countries.  Indeed, further efforts that go beyond the 
Lamfalussy framework which do not take account of further integration in EU financial 
markets might potentially undermine financial development and reduce the overall 
efficiency of EU capital markets.   
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The paper will also evaluate the various institutional models for explaining how 
the Lamfalussy programme has produced a rapid consolidation of European Community 
regulatory powers.  Although the Lamfalussy programme speeds up and consolidates 
regulatory decisionmaking through enhanced comitology powers, it is essentially a 
regulatory process that does not necessarily involve substantive harmonisation of EU 
securities legislation, and therefore is not a significant departure from traditional notions 
of inter-governmental coordination in EU policymaking.  Although the early stages of 
implementation of the Lamfalussy programme have ignited much controversy concerning 
the scope of legislative authority for Community institutions, Lamfalussy streamlines 
decision-making and requires consultation and transparency and does not undermine the 
vital role that national regulators and market participants play in regulating securities 
markets.        
 This paper contains five parts.  Part I discusses the nature of financial market 
integration and the liberalisation of regulatory controls in the European Union.  Part II 
analyses the economic rationale for securities regulation and sets forth some of the 
criteria for determining whether additional consolidation of regulatory powers at the EU 
level would promote the efficient development of EU securities markets.  Indeed, it 
argues that because the EU may not yet be an optimum economic area for a single 
regulator that further consolidation and centralisation could potentially undermine 
economic growth and hinder the efficient development of EU securities markets.  
Although certain efficiencies can be gained by adopting a more centralised EU approach, 
existing structural differences in EU financial markets and different market practices and 
legal systems militate against increased centralisation of securities regulation.   
Part III generally describes the existing institutional structure and regulatory 
principles governing EU financial supervision and regulation.  Part IV generally 
describes the Lamfalussy programme and assesses whether its regulatory framework and 
institutional structure can achieve the economic objectives of efficiency and institutional 
accountability.  Although the section points out the positive effects of establishing a more 
centralised EU process for devising securities legislation, it suggests that efficient 
regulation of EU securities markets requires a EU supervisory framework whereby high 
level principles are adopted at the EU level (based on member state proposals and 
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industry consultation) but more specific rules and codes are devised and implemented by 
national authorities.  Such a structure would address the need to have general principles 
of good governance in EU markets, whilst recognising that implementation of such 
principles must take account of differences amongst member states in institutional and 
economic structures.9  This approach is especially important for the efficient integration 
of the accession countries’ financial markets into the EU regulatory framework.       
Part V examines the principles of institutional design in the European Community 
and suggests that the Lamfalussy programme represents a continuing trend in EU 
economic regulation whereby inter-governmental negotiations and bargaining produce an 
institutional and policymaking process that respects EU constitutional principles, yet 
proves adaptable and flexible enough to address the specific economic challenges posed 
by increasing liberalisation and deregulation in financial markets.  Part VI evaluates the 
crucial issue of whether the European Union qualifies as an optimum economic area for 
securities regulation.  The theoretical basis for determining optimum economic areas 
derives from Merton’s criteria for optimum currency areas.  I apply these principles, with 
some modification, with respect to cross-border trading in securities and financial 
services.  This section analyses some of the theories of financial market integration and 
provides a preliminary assessment of various measures of market integration.  The 
section discusses the issue of whether the economic rationale for a more centralised EU 
securities regulation regime has been properly thought out and the threat a single 
regulatory regime may pose to the efficient development of EU securities markets.   
The paper’s main policy recommendation holds that as long as EU securities markets 
remain highly segmented and fragmented along national jurisdictional lines, securities 
regulation should remain primarily nationally-based.  EU institutional structures and high 
level principles, however, have a role to play in promoting the Treaty objective of an 
internal market while ensuring that the goal of financial integration is ultimately 
achieved.  This means that further centralisation and consolidation of EU securities 
regulation that goes beyond the Lamfalussy framework could potentially undermine EU 
financial development and economic growth.  Alternatively, the task for policymakers 
could involve implementing the Lamfalaussy programme in a manner that fosters 
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competition in regulation practices amongst national bodies so that a more organic, 
economically induced regulatory regime emerges to govern EU securities markets.   
 
I. EU financial markets and the extent of integration  
EU securities markets are of major importance in performing the function of raising 
and promoting the raising of capital that generates economic growth and development.  
The main components of the EU capital markets consist of financial activity in bonds, 
equities, syndicated loans, derivatives trading, euro commercial paper, medium-term 
euro-note programmes.  Euro bonds constitute the largest portion of total issues.  
Dramatic growth and innovation in international bond markets and cross-border trading 
in equities has had a tremendous impact on EU financial markets. 
Equity markets have played a particularly important role in raising capital and 
providing liquidity for EU capital markets.  Equity markets include publicly listed 
companies on stock exchanges that provide investors with prescribed levels of disclosure 
that enable the efficient pricing of securities, along with the ‘off-market’ work of venture 
capital firms that are willing to assume higher levels of risk for higher, but more 
speculative, returns.  More generally, securities markets involve equity and debt offerings 
with a similarly high range of risk tolerance.  The financial systems of many countries in 
the European Union, however, have relied relatively less on capital markets (for both 
equities and bonds) vis-à-vis bank finance.  For instance, corporate finance in Germany 
has placed much greater emphasis on bank lending to supply capital needs, whereas 
equity capital has been a much more important source of finance for UK and Irish 
companies.  Some jurisdictions, like the US and UK, restrict the level of bank finance for 
listed companies based on strict statutory and regulatory requirements.   
Most experts agree that integration of EU equity markets is at a relatively 
undeveloped stage, whereas euro bond, foreign exchange and wholesale bank lending 
markets are more integrated.10  Equity markets will play an increasing role in capital 
formation and in cross-border trading in collateral interests in securities.11  Equity 
markets will also remain a primary focus of regulators in devising regulations to 
liberalise cross-border trading in securities, and in many cases the regulations written for 
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securities have also been applied to the corporate debt and commodities 
markets.(McCleskey, 2003). 
 
Integration in EU financial markets 
A truly integrated EU financial services market would ideally involve the following 
factors.  Investors would be able to invest in instruments issued and traded in other 
member states without regulatory impediments.  Intermediaries would have the ability to 
transact freely with clients in other member states on the same terms and conditions as 
local businesses.  Issuers would have access to deeper and more liquid markets with 
lower bid-ask spreads and reduced transaction costs and capital costs.  For clearing and 
settlement, infrastructure suppliers would provide access to their facilities to all market 
participants and users across the EU.  And regulators and supervisors would have the 
ability to prosecute cross-border transactions that involve violations of EU or member 
state financial regulations, and to undertake investigations and enforcement actions in an 
effective and speedy manner so as to deter future misconduct.   
Such truly integrated financial markets would create benefits in terms of enhanced 
market liquidity, and more efficient allocation of investment resources.  The lower cost of 
capital would lead to increased investment.  Higher returns on private savings for small 
investors, pension funds and other collective investment schemes would help defuse 
Europe’s looming pension crisis.  Increased integration would make more venture capital 
available for higher risk investment projects and firms; this would lead to enhanced 
financial innovation and further development of the high risk small and medium 
enterprise sector.12   
In some areas, EU financial markets have shown high levels of integration relative to 
other areas.  For instance, banks have direct access to central bank liquidity in the 
eurozone which has supported the creation of a fully integrated money market for 
interbank liquidity transfers.13  For banks that are active participants in the euro interbank 
market,14 the data show that overnight lending rates have narrowed substantially since 
1999 across banks in all eurozone jurisdictions as overnight rates have fallen to around 
two basis points.15  Another area of rapid integration is the repo market where liquidity 
(de facto loans) is exchanged against collateral.  Less integration exists for eurozone 
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banks that make unsecured loans to other sophisticated counterparties in different EU 
jurisdictions because of higher levels of credit risk and the need to monitor the 
creditworthiness of foreign counterparties (Holthausen & Freixas, 2001).  It should be 
noted that the extent of integration will also depend on the degree of cross-border 
cooperation and coordination between supervisors in obtaining information on cross-
border parties and how much of this information is made available to market participants.   
By contrast, European Union securities and investment services markets exhibit 
significantly lower levels of integration and are generally viewed as fragmented in 
comparison with US markets.(Lamfalussy et al., 2001).  Capital formation is essentially 
segmented within national jurisdictions, while very little cross-border activity takes place 
in the life insurance, pensions business and other retail sectors.  Although some of the 
fragmentation may be attributed to regulatory obstacles, the major causes have more to 
do with fundamental structural and cultural factors.(McCleskey, 2003).  For instance, 
differences in taxation deter cross-border sale and branch activity in both wholesale and 
retail markets.  Different investor preferences have resulted in different appetites for risk 
in financial products across jurisdictions. 
 
II. The Economic Rationale For European Securities Regulation  
 
This section presents the economic rationale for financial regulation and weighs the 
economic advantages and disadvantages of regulating EU securities markets.     
 
The rationale for economic and financial regulation 
The normative theory of regulation holds that public regulation of economic activity 
is only justified to remedy market failure, that is, when the market is incapable of 
producing a social or Pareto optimum.  Market failure can take many forms, but most 
prominently it occurs in cases of monopoly, imperfect information, and negative 
externalities.  According to this view, regulation should only be used to correct market 
failures, and not for other social purposes, such as income redistribution. 
In contrast, another major theory of regulation is the positive theory (Stigler 1970), 
which holds that regulation is not adopted for the protection and benefit of the public at 
large, but is designed and implemented primarily for the benefit of special interest groups 
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(ie., industries subject to the regulation).  The positive theory of regulation has been 
elaborated upon by Posner (1974) and Becker (1983) and will be discussed further below.   
Generally, financial regulation has several main objectives.  (1) to minimise systemic 
risk so that financial instruments are priced to cover the costs of the risk they pose to the 
broader economy.  The efficient pricing of risk in financial markets will avoid the 
situation where the collapse of one bank or large financial firm causes the collapse of 
other financial institutions, which may lead to a domino effect resulting in the collapse of 
the entire financial system.  (2) To enhance competition so that financial institutions 
allocate capital in a manner that promotes efficient risk taking and competitive prices for 
financial products.  (3) Investor protection so that asymmetries of information are 
minimised to promote equality of investment opportunities and adequate remedies for 
losses incurred because of market abuse or financial crime.  (4) To promote the overall 
efficiency and integrity of capital markets so that investors have a high degree of 
confidence in the system.  Indeed, financial regulation that is based on these objectives 
can provide significant benefits that enable societies to operate in a more efficient and 
humane way. 
In assessing the benefits of securities regulation, Easterbrook and Fischel have argued 
that no valid evidence exists to show that disclosure rules directed against fraud and 
market manipulation produce any economic benefits.16  The better view, however, 
justifies disclosure requirements in securities regulations on the basis that they reduce 
asymmetries of information between investors and issuers, thereby promoting improved 
risk evaluation and efficient pricing of securities.  Moreover, ensuring that market 
participants adhere to disclosure rules requires an effective enforcement mechanism to 
deter financial misconduct, such as fraud and market abuse.  In addition, the problem of 
legal risk arises where specific laws are uncertain in regulating particular transactions.  
Indeed, legal uncertainty results in higher social costs to the extent that businesses and 
other economic actors require detailed legal opinions before entering into transactions.  
Where it is necessary to reduce legal uncertainty so as to reduce regulatory compliance 
costs, it demonstrates that in some situations more regulation (at least in disclosure and 
transparency) can reduce economic costs and therefore be preferable to less. 
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Direct and indirect costs of regulation  
Advocates of regulatory reform often over-emphasise the perceived benefits at the 
expense of the social costs created.  Indeed, Coase noted that when divergences occurred 
between private and social product, too much emphasis was placed on the specific 
deficiency that had created the externality, which often resulted in the view that any 
governmental or regulatory measure to eliminate the externality was desirable.(Coase 
1960, p. 43).  The regulatory intervention often ‘diverts attention from those other 
changes in the system which are inevitably associated with the corrective measure, 
changes which may well produce more harm than the original deficiency’.17  The 
regulatory debate often fails to take account of the costs, direct and indirect, of any 
reform proposals.  Some of the more obvious costs in securities regulation include the 
administrative burden of complying with regulatory requirements and in particular 
disclosing specific information and due diligence reports.  This involves complying with 
authorisation standards, licence fees and other charges, capitalisation and reserve 
requirements.  As mentioned above, there are also indirect costs that may arise from legal 
uncertainty, which may bear directly on economic activity that includes ‘opportunity 
costs’, ‘transaction costs’, and ‘compliance costs’.      
Regulations may adversely affect consumers by imposing higher prices for goods 
and services, and result in reduced consumer choice and lower quality goods and 
services.  For both investors and issuing companies, excessive or inefficient securities 
regulation can result in higher costs for capital.  Government also increases costs for 
itself through adopting new regulatory processes and requirements: the number and level 
of staffing, salary costs, the costs of surveillance and enforcement impose costs on 
taxpayers and thus may constrain economic growth.  Indeed, securities regulatory 
requirements may result in lost opportunities or misallocation of resources.     
Although regulation of securities markets can enhance liquidity and efficiency in 
resource allocation, it can also create unreasonable obstacles and barriers to trade in 
financial services that may impede cross-borders efficiencies by deterring foreign 
investors and issuers.  Indeed, restrictive trade barriers may lead to reduced investor 
opportunities and thereby drive ‘riskier’ investments from the markets.18  This might 
explain why securities underwriters are less willing to take certain high-risk securities to 
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market if they face greater potential legal liability.  This would result in investors having 
access to fewer possible investment opportunities, whereas in the absence of such 
regulation, the investors would have merely expected a higher compensation for investing 
in risky securities.  National economic growth might also be undermined because 
enterprises involved in riskier behaviour could have less funds available to finance new 
ventures.             
 Indirect costs of regulation arise from lost opportunities in relation to innovation 
and optimally negotiated outcomes.  One view holds that regulators should refrain from 
prescribing market outcomes unless it is absolutely necessary to do so.  This can be 
demonstrated in the area of prospectus requirements where the regulatory policy 
underlying the capital raising provisions of company law is that of protecting investors by 
endeavouring to ensure that all information relevant to the making of an informed 
investment decision has been provided regarding any invitation or offer of securities.  
One rationale for prospectus requirements is that the costs involved in making regulatory 
disclosures would still be incurred even if the law did not exist, because investors would 
require the company to undertake similar exercise before they would be willing to invest 
in the company.  This assertion raises a number of questions, such as would certain 
investors require less rigorous disclosure or, indeed, none at all?  Is there an equitable 
rationale for requiring a company to disclose voluminous information to professional 
investors who would hardly be described as vulnerable members of society?  Perhaps, in 
a diversified market of retail and professional investors, information disclosure 
requirements should be tailored to the needs of the investor and while this may mean, in 
certain circumstances, that the costs of disclosing to investors are the same as what would 
be incurred under the current regulations, it may also result in less total cost as some 
investors require less disclosure to make an informed investment.  Similarly, it may also 
result in less total costs for some investors who may only focus on certain parts of 
information already disclosed.    
In most EU jurisdictions, securities regulation does not permit such an option for 
the company and investor to agree to a lower cost method of prospectus disclosure.  
Indeed, under existing EU securities regulation, there is little or no recognition that the 
higher risk profile of low disclosing companies will discourage investment in those 
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companies.  According to this view, unresponsive investors to low-disclosing and high-
risk companies would create a powerful incentive for these companies to provide more 
disclosure.  When regulators attempt to prescribe a certain level of disclosure, they often 
achieve sub-optimal outcomes and discourage future, efficient behaviour. 
 In addition, it is also difficult for regulators to respond to rapid changes of 
behaviour and sentiment in the marketplace.  Indeed, much of commerce involves the 
acquisition of information through repeat transactions, which may lead buyers and sellers 
to adopt a joint welfare maximising strategy in which they agree to cooperate and provide 
information necessary to enhance their returns.  This view raises the important issue of 
whether regulations should force a company to disclose information which is not 
necessary, based on the parties’ requirements, for the transaction to proceed.  The 
opposing view to this position is that the relaxation of prospectus requirements will 
permit abuse of the innocent investor by a large, unscrupulous company.19   
 
Industry Consultation 
Any EU securities regulatory regime and its accompanying institutional structure 
should recognise the views of market participants.  It is true that market participants 
rarely share common views on any one issue, but they do serve as an acceptable source of 
empirical information that is often more reliable than theoretical or ideological arguments 
advocating particular regulatory structures.  Indeed, many experts have recognised that, 
because financial markets are rapidly changing, that market participants often have an 
advantage in assessing the impact of regulatory controls on market behaviour, and their 
views should be taken into account when formulating regulatory rules.   
This perspective, however, can be criticised for being too narrowly focused on 
transacting parties, while giving little weight to the externalities that may affect third 
parties and also to broader societal goals.  Nevertheless, a compelling argument can be 
made that the views of market participants should take precedence, rather than the views 
of regulators and experts.  Some observers have even raised the issue in such a way that if 
a regulator or policymakers identify the need for a regulatory reform because it might 
protect market participants, yet market participants strenuously oppose such reform, it 
may well be advised to consider, at length, why there is a gap between the theory of 
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regulatory practice and the desires of market participants.20  The question arises why the 
regulators are proposing reforms that will have a deleterious effect?  Is it because of 
information asymmetry?  Do the regulators have different access to market information 
or simply not able to discern the relevant information.  Are special interests groups 
addressing the true deficiencies affecting the market?  Should market participants be 
given a role in influencing whether regulations should take effect?  More broadly, should 
the goal of securities regulation be to lessen the impediments to privately-negotiated 
market outcomes? 
 The above discussion suggests that regulation prevents, or at least hinders, 
innovation and adaptation.  Regulation should foster decision-making that emphasises 
choices over time, rather than leaving to experts the authority to determine the right way 
to perform transactions.  The securities markets of many EU member states, and most 
particularly of the accession states, are undeveloped and need robust and flexible 
regulatory standards to promote economic growth on a permanent basis.  The OECD has 
noted that company creation and growth and vibrant capital markets in the European 
Community depend on low compliance costs in the areas of taxation and securities 
regulation.21 
 
Cost-benefit analysis of EU securities regulation 
Regulation exists not only in the interest of investors but also in the interests of 
business enterprises that seek to raise capital.  When members of the public are offered 
the opportunity to invest in intangible property claims, it is generally agreed that there 
should be disclosure by the persons making the offers.22  Disclosure is necessary in the 
primary market for securities, as well as in the secondary market where securities have 
already been issued and are traded.  Also, the availability of capital for business 
endeavours requires confidence by the investing public in the honesty and efficiency of 
securities markets and in the individuals who carry out transactions in securities.  
Securities should not be seen as merely a set of restrictions on market behaviour, but also 
as facilitative of securities trading and capital formation. 
Any evaluation of whether the EU is constructing an optimal securities regulation 
regime must take account of an economic framework that examines the purported 
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benefits of securities regulation and balances it against the costs associated with adopting 
the regime that will be incurred by market participants and the regulatory authority.  This 
type of cost-benefit analysis is an important aspect of the law and economics approach to 
economic regulation.  It utilises economic analysis to predict and test both the allocative 
and distributive impact of alternative legal regimes of regulation, and provides 
indispensable insights into the implications of regulatory policy choices.  Although there 
is a substantial and growing body of economic, legal and philosophical literature that 
generally criticises the law and economics approach, the economics profession has 
recently utilised various analytical and empirical techniques to provide some useful 
insights on the regulatory debate (Deakin 1999).23  
Empirical data is needed to obtain a better understanding of the relationship of 
how laws affect economic behaviour.  There are many ways in which the efficacy of 
securities regulation can be evaluated, whilst there are several methodologies by which 
the application and implementation of regulations can be optimised.  Economic analysis 
can involve a number of principles and methods to ascertain optimal levels of regulation, 
including ‘regulatory cost-benefit analysis’, ‘opportunity costs’, macroeconomics, and 
efficient breach and enforcement.24  An assessment of the net regulatory burden of 
securities regulation for any jurisdiction should take account of both costs and benefits.  
This involves comparing the incremental costs incurred less the marginal benefits 
realised from the adopted regulation.  A cost-benefit analysis would involve a thorough 
examination of whether market freedom should be curtailed based on clear regulatory 
objectives and whether the benefits of market intervention outweigh the costs.  Many 
economists argue, however, that applying a cost-benefit analysis involves inherently 
subjective criteria and vague measures that can only estimate with a wide margin of error 
what the true costs and benefits of regulation are.25 
 
III.  EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL  REGULATION,  
SUPERVISION AND POLICY-MAKING – 
 
This section provides an overview of EU principles of regulation and supervision and 
the general legal framework governing financial regulation and whether it has achieved 
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market integration.  The primary legal basis for the creation of an internal and integrated 
market for capital and financial services is found in the Treaty of Rome of 1957, as 
amended, which established the European Community.  The Treaty set forth the four 
essential freedoms – free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital26 - for the 
creation of an internal free market in the European Community.  The four freedoms were 
the legal instruments to achieve the economic objective of an internal European market.  
The prerequisites for the internal European market were the removal of trade barriers, 
establishment of a customs union, and eventually a common, internal market.27  Some 
scholars have noted, however, that the economic objectives of the Treaty and subsequent 
EU legislation are mere instruments of political integration.(Wallace & Wallace, 2000 & 
McCleskey, 2003).  Therefore, much of the economic policy-making that drives the EU 
internal market programme can possibly be called into question on economic efficiency 
grounds because of its over-riding political dimension.   
 
EU Legal and Regulatory Principles  
The supervisory framework for banking and financial services within the European 
Union’s internal market relies primarily on the principles of home country control and 
minimum harmonization. (Andenas & Avgerinos, 2003)28  According to the principle of 
home country control, regulatory authority over banks and investment firms that conduct 
activities through their branches in other member states lies with the competent 
authorities in the state where the institution’s head office is located.  According to the 
principle of minimum harmonization, member states are required to harmonise what are 
considered the essential areas of financial regulation while being free to surpass EU 
minimum standards and to maintain national regulation in areas not harmonised.  The 
minimum standards to be incorporated in national regulation by all member states were 
established in directives issued by the EC Council.29   
EC regulation does not prescribe the type of banking or securities trading system a 
member country must have.  Rather, each member state continues to develop its 
traditional banking system under the impact of increasing competition in the European 
market.  For instance, under the EC Banking Directives, the same type of activity will be 
subject to the same prudential rules (ie., Capital Adequacy Directive), whether it is 
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undertaken by a universal bank, an investment bank, or another specialized bank.30  
Similarly, EU directives do not require a particular institutional structure of financial 
supervision.  Regulatory responsibilities may be allocated according to types of 
institutions or tasks.  But a state seeking to join the European Union must demonstrate 
that it has complied with a fixed set of rules and regulations, which include legislative 
implementation of all relevant EU directives and regulations on financial regulation.  For 
example, a member state must allow a investment firm incorporated in another member 
state complete access to its market.  It must recognise the regulatory and supervisory 
standards of the EU state which serves as the home country of the firm seeking access to 
its market.  In contrast, a host EU state may resort to case-by-case negotiations with a 
non-EU state before it agrees market access to a non-EU financial firm based in a non-
EU state.   
Mutual recognition rules are based on common objectives and can only work 
effectively if regulators have confidence in the standards of other member state 
regulators.  The advantage of mutual recognition is that it generates a competitive process 
of regulation that may lead eventually (in theory) to convergence of regulatory standards.  
Mutual recognition based on home country rules has been praised as producing common 
EU standard more quickly than if host country rules had applied.  Generally, the home 
country principle has functioned effectively in integrating EU markets, but further 
harmonisation of standards can be expected as a result of market forces and increasing 
pressures from national and EU governments.  This will result in reduced powers for host 
countries to restrict cross-border trade in investment services through the use of 
notification procedures and the general good principle.31  Some experts assert that the 
home country control principle will become less effective in the future as large financial 
groups increase their operations in the EU market by establishing home operations in 
more than one jurisdiction.32  Accordingly, some experts have raised the issue of whether 
the EU itself should be a home market? (Lanoo, 2002).  
Although these regulatory and legal principles have provided a sound basis for 
achieving some of the objectives of the internal market for capital and financial services, 
many regulatory and policy gaps remain and EU financial services markets continue to be 
significantly segmented along member state boundaries.  EC Commission officials argue 
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that existing directives and regulations, along with the principle of home country control 
and mutual recognition based on the equivalence of member state regulation, have been 
overtaken by market developments and that obstacles to market integration can only be 
eliminated by adopting a more harmonised regulatory and legal framework combined 
with a more consolidated, centralised institutional structure of financial regulation.33  At 
present, cross-border provision of financial services confronts a number of national 
regulatory and legal barriers.  Although the Second Banking Directive and the Investment 
Services Directive have facilitated cross-border establishment of firms, the remote 
provision of financial services is still strictly limited by most host countries based on 
‘general good’ rules.  Moreover, much uncertainty remains regarding the treatment of 
new types of business, such as execution only trading services and alternative trading 
services (ATSs).  Cross-border capital raising requires adherence to host country rules 
with the result that there are few examples of multiple listings because of the complexity 
and high costs.  In addition to legal and regulatory barriers, many economic, social and 
cultural barriers have obstructed cross-border trade in financial services.   
 
EU Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
In 1999, the European Commission proposed the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP),34 which constitutes the agenda for achieving an integrated European market in 
financial services.  The FSAP proposes priorities and time-scales for legislative and other 
regulatory measures aimed at four strategic objectives: (1) a single market for wholesale 
financial services, (2) open and secure retail markets, (3) modernised prudential rules and 
supervision of intermediaries and securities firms, and (4) improved conditions for an 
optimal single financial market.  The FSAP contains 42 measures to achieve these 
objectives that have been updated over time to take account of evolving challenges in the 
market, such as institutions becoming organised on a pan-European or cross-sectoral 
basis, and major corporate and financial frauds (ie., Enron & WorldCom).  Some of the 
more significant of these legislative measures have taken the form of directives that 
provide uniform EU requirements for admission to trading and prospectuses for public 
offers (Prospectus Directive), transparency in periodic reporting of issuers (Transparency 
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Directive), rules on ad hoc disclosure of price sensitive information (Market Abuse 
Directive), and imposing admission requirements for free negotiability of instruments on 
‘regulated markets’ (Investment Services Directive).   
The FSAP agenda for increasing market integration in securities and investment 
services envisions investors being able to raise capital throughout the EU, and 
instruments being tradable across the EU.  It also seeks to achieve a centralised 
infrastructure for the finalisation of financial transactions, such as clearing and 
settlement, and the development of prudential rules in this area.  Investors should face 
seamless capital markets into which they can place and withdraw their investments and 
profits.  The FSAP envisions adoption of the securities and investment legislative 
measures by December 2003.  Obstacles remain, however, regarding the takeover 
directive and international accounting standards. 
The FSAP has set forth an elaborate new regulatory and legal framework to create a 
more harmonised EU regulatory regime.  It also seeks to narrow the general good 
exception rules that have previously allowed host countries to maintain protectionist 
regulatory policies against foreign service providers.  The FSAP has adopted an 
ambitious programme to harmonise and liberalise EU trade in financial services and 
capital markets.  The FSAP is premised on the view that the adoption of legal and 
regulatory instruments (42 FSAP measures) that require a more harmonised and 
liberalised capital and financial markets will necessarily lead to true integration of EU 
financial markets.  This paper contests this premise by asserting that liberalisation of 
capital and financial markets will not inevitably lead to integration of financial markets.  
To achieve true integration, EU and national regulators must address macroeconomic 
distortions and market failures, and social and cultural factors that pose the major the 
problem in Europe’s financial markets remain fragmented and segmented.  Despite the 
FSAPs focus on regulatory and legal barriers, data suggests and economic theory holds 
that other obstacles, such as market failure, differences in taxation and heterogeneous 
investor preferences are the chief factors in keeping Europe’s financial markets 
fragmented and segmented.     
 
IV.  EU Securities Regulation and the Lamfalussy Programme 
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The European Council recognised the Lamfalussy Report in March 2001 at the 
Stockholm Council meeting as the basis from which a new enhanced comitology 
procedure would be established containing a four-level approach for proposing, adopting 
and implementing EU securities legislation.  The four-levels are composed of essential 
principles, implementing measures, co-operation, and enforcement.35  It should be noted 
that the Lamfalussy programme is primarily concerned with regulatory process, and not 
necessarily with the harmonisation of EU securities regulation throughout the Union.  
Pursuant to the Lamfalussy programme, the Commission created in June 2001 a 
European Securities Committee (ESC) and a Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR).36  
The ongoing implementation of the Lamfalussy programme is providing the 
Commission, in conjunction with the ESC and CESR, with increased authority to develop 
the relevant legislative and regulatory tools to respond to the rapidly changing cross-
border nature of European securities markets.  In this process, the EU ministers of 
finance, who compose the ECOFIN Council, are jointly responsible with the Parliament 
for approving the directives, while they are individually responsible for ensuring 
consistency between European legislation and national regulation.37   
 
European Securities Committee (ESC) 
The Commission Decision of 6 June 200138 established the European Securities 
Committee (ESC), which replaced the High Level Securities Supervisors Committee 
(HLSSC).39  The ESC was established to act in a regulatory capacity, within the 
framework of the Comitology Decision of 1999.40  The ESC plays the main role in the 
four-level regulatory approach to expedite the regulatory process for EU securities 
regulation and to make it more flexible and efficient.41  Level 1 refers to EU framework 
legislation and essential measures, which will be adopted by the standard co-decision 
procedure by the Council and the Parliament.  These two bodies will also agree on the 
nature and extent of the implementing measures to be decided at Level 2 on the basis of 
Commission proposals. Level 2 refers to EU implementation and the non-essential 
measures, which will be defined, proposed and adopted, in application of the Comitology 
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Decision, by the Commission and the ESC, while the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) will act in an advisory capacity. Level 3 refers to strengthened 
cooperation between regulators to improve implementation, which will be designed to 
improve consistency of day-to-day transposition and implementation of Levels 1 and 2 
legislation. This stage involves the Member States and the CESR. Finally, Level 4 refers 
to enforcement and involves the Commission and the Member States. 
Although the new legislative structure is believed to respond to the need for speed, 
efficiency and flexibility in securities regulation,42 some have criticised it for creating 
more problems than it was meant to solve.  Mutual suspicion among national and 
European institutions has complicated the enactment of financial legislation in the EU.  In 
particular, the Parliament has expressed concerns and has voted in favour of a “call back” 
procedure that would enable it to review and halt legislation proposed at Level 2.  The 
Parliament adopted a “sunset clause” that will terminate the ESC four years after the 
entry into force of the directives creating it (2005), unless its powers are redefined by a 
new Commission proposal that is approved by the Parliament and the Council.43  
The Parliament’s concerns are also shared by market participants, the securities 
industry and experts who criticise Level 2 implementing procedures as lacking 
transparency.  The financial sector would prefer more direct consultation and 
transparency at the Level 2 implementing stage, especially in view of the accelerating 
changes occurring in European financial markets.44  Other important issues concern how 
to distinguish between the essential statutory measures of Level 1 and the implementing 
measures of Level 2.  Or, more precisely, what is to be decided by the normal co-decision 
procedure of the Council and the Parliament and what should be delegated to the 
Commission and the ESC?  The Lamfalussy Report has failed to give sufficient guidance 
on this issue, but the success of the new regime will heavily depend on the clear 
definition and distinction between essential and non-essential measures (Avgerinos, 
2003)(Lenaerts, 1993).45 
 
The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) 
Following the suggestions of the Lamfalussy Report, the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators was established.46  CESR comprises the securities commissions of 
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the EEA countries. Its role is to act as an independent advisory group to assist the 
Commission in particular in its preparation of Level 2 draft implementing measures. At 
this level, as in its Level 3 role, the CESR consults extensively in an open and transparent 
manner, fully involving market participants, consumers and end-users. The aim is to 
achieve a balance between effective consultation and efficient use of the limited 
resources devoted by all interested parties in the regulatory issues in the securities field. It 
also attempts to balance effective consultation with the fact that, at Level 2, the 
Committee will be constrained by the scope and timetable of the mandates given to it by 
the European Commission. All those involved in the consultation process will need to 
“play a co-operative game”, in other words, to work in a manner that promotes the 
success of the process.47 
CESR organises its own operational arrangements.48 The costs relating to the 
administration of the CESR is borne entirely by the national supervisory authorities 
comprising the membership of the committee. Significantly, the Commission plays a key 
role in CESR’s procedures, as it does with the ESC, by providing mandates to CESR to 
address certain issues within certain time limits.  The Commission also informs CESR of 
political priorities, while contributing to consultations regarding the development of new 
policy.   
CESR also performs tasks that extend beyond its consultation role, which include, 
inter alia, developing and reviewing common and uniform implementation methods at 
Level 3 to achieve harmonised regulatory standards in applying Community legislation; 
issuing voluntary guidelines, recommendations and standards for members to introduce 
into their regulatory practices; developing effective operational networks to promote 
consistent supervision across member states and cross-border coordination enforcing EU 
securities regulation; and assessing changes in financial markets along with global trends 
in regulation with consideration for the impact on the EU Single Market for financial 
services.49 
Some weaknesses in CESR are that its members do not have equivalent degrees of 
authority in their respective jurisdictions to implement negotiated proposals.  This can 
result in uneven implementation and enforcement of EU standards and rules, which may 
create competitive distortions in the market.  In some jurisdictions, further complications 
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could arise because there are several regulatory authorities responsible for securities and 
investment services regulation.(Goodhart, 1998).50 
Moreover, the issues of transparency and accountability for both the ESC and CESR 
are important for efficient development of EU financial markets.  Although they must 
submit annual reports to the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, the public does 
not have complete access to these reports and to the minutes of meetings.  Potentially, the 
inter-institutional committee, envisaged in Article 15 of Regulation 1049/2001 of 30 May 
2001 regarding public access to Parliament, Council and Commission documents,51 could 
act to enhance transparency and accountability by proposing changes to the comitology 
procedures that create clearer lines of authority in administrative practices while 
providing improved public access to official deliberations. 
   The idea of establishing a EU securities regulator with authority to devise and 
adopt EU-wide standards and rules for securities regulation is premised on the notion that 
a single regulatory regime can reduce overall operating costs for firms and for the 
economy at large (Avgerinos 2003).  The emerging EU regulatory framework is designed 
generally to fulfil the freedoms of the Common Market while also addressing the concern 
that globalisation and an overemphasis on regulatory costs can result in a ‘race to the 
bottom’ where competing jurisdictions cause a downward spiral of deregulation that will 
deprive investors and borrowers of adequate protections.  On the other hand, the theory of 
international regulatory competition asserts that competing jurisdictions will produce the 
most efficient capital market regulation because they will try to attract financial 
businesses by establishing the most economically efficient laws and regulatory 
environment.52  Empirical work has demonstrated that investors will impose a risk 
premium on investments issued or traded in an environment where those investors are not 
adequately protected from market manipulation.53  In these circumstances, investors will 
charge higher premia for two types of regulations: (a) those which impose excessive 
burdens in the form of regulatory and opportunity costs, and (b) those which do not 
adequately protect investors from unscrupulous market behaviour. Investors will only 
consider the risk premium as sufficiently reduced when the regulatory environment 
provides an optimal balancing between investor protection and cost efficiency.54  Issuers 
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who fail to take account of investor concern will incur higher costs for raising debt or 
equity.   
The above discussion shows how investors’ concerns drive securities prices.  
Assuming that investors have more influence on the development of regulations or 
alternatively can choose which jurisdiction they would be willing to purchase securities, 
then these investor preferences would influence the development of rules that were closer 
to achieving efficient price formation in the marketplace.  This would be a positive 
development in regulatory policy.  In this way, market participants would contribute to 
the appropriate balance of regulations and this balance would be honed by competing 
regulations in other jurisdictions.  Therefore, in the absence of additional empirical 
evidence, the concern with ‘the race to the bottom’ hypothesis is rather overstated.   
In the European Community, a major development in the internal market has been 
the movement towards greater harmonisation of securities market laws and regulations 
amongst member states based on the principles of home country control and minimum 
harmonisation.  Serious concern has been raised regarding the adoption of standards and 
rules in the Lamfalussy 4-level framework which might impede the efficient development 
of harmonised EU securities market rules because they are superimposed by EU 
authorities with little consideration for the organic development of regulation in response 
to market trends at the state level.  No doubt there would be significant gains (discussed 
below) in convenience for companies and investors if rules were harmonised at the EU 
level, but there is no assurance that harmonised rules would always produce the most 
efficient result, especially if they are devised by regulators who are detached from recent 
market developments and the needs of participants.  Moreover, the institutional structure  
of regulation may impact the design of efficient rules, and thereby impact market stability 
and confidence.  This is why proposals for a EU securities regulator and for further 
consolidation of the regulatory framework through the Lamfalussy programme can 
impact efficiency in securities markets and undermine economic growth. 
The theoretical basis for further centralisation of European securities regulation can 
be justified on the grounds of the normative and public interest theories of regulation.  
Although regulation can often be explained by the selfish economic and political 
objectives of interest groups, the policy rationale for regulation is usually couched in 
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terms of the overall public interest.  It is at that level where the regulatory policy debate 
must take place.  Indeed, policymakers and administrators should seek to assess the role 
of regulation by weighing the advantages and disadvantages of specific programmes with 
respect to how regulatory standards and rules impact allocative efficiency in the 
marketplace and serve the overall public good. 
 
 V.   Institutional Design  
The rationale for inter-state coordination  
 
The evolution of the European Community has involved a grand experiment in which 
some of the world’s leading nation states have pooled increasing areas of policy authority 
by introducing collective institutions to regulate economic relations.  International 
relations scholars have used several theoretical perspectives to explain these 
arrangements of collective governance.  The most prominent of these is the 
‘intergovernmentalist’ perspective, which conceptualises European integration as the 
practice of ordinary diplomacy under conditions creating opportunities to provide 
collective goods through highly institutionalised negotiations (Moravcsik 1993; Pierson 
1998).  This theory views the EC as an institutional form of collective action amongst 
nation states in which member state governments remain the only important actors at the 
EU level, and policymaking is conducted through negotiations amongst member state 
governments or through specific delegations of authority.  Domestic actors ordinarily 
exert influence through national political structures of member states.  The ‘Chiefs of 
Government’ (‘COGs’) are the key actors in the EC and seek to maximise their own 
advantage.   
Inter-governmentalism draws upon rational choice theory that provides flexible 
conceptual tools to explain why national governments would favour particular outcomes 
(Green and Shapiro 1994; Pierson 1998).  However, it lacks an over-arching theory to 
explain how transnational institutional structures create constraints on member state 
governments.  It raises important questions, such as why member state governments 
desire certain outcomes; which governments exercise the most influence on the collective 
decision-making process; and which COG alliances can explain policy or institutional 
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developments in the EC (Moravcsik 1991; Martin 1993; Pierson 1998).  Moreover, it 
fails to account for how the EU has emerged as a more complicated and pluralistic 
structure that resembles more of a quasi-federal polity (Dehousse 1994; Majone 1992).  
This critical perspective is concerned less with advancing broad theories of economic and 
political integration than with detailed investigations of day-to-day EC policy 
development and the increasingly prominent role of EC institutions.  Research in this area 
has focussed on specific issue areas in which inter-governmental policymaking has 
resulted in a dense and pluralistic political process, not completely controlled by national 
governments and not explicable by grand diplomatic bargains.   
 Another theoretical approach that exposes the limitations of intergovernmentalist 
accounts is neo-functionalism.  Neo-functionalism originated as an optimistic analysis of 
the benefits of informal cooperation between states.  The theory, deriving from David 
Mitrany’s functionalist approach to world unification, has evolved over time to 
incorporate a more realist view of how power politics has shaped European integration 
(Haas, 1958).55  Indeed, Haas examined how and why ‘nation-states cease to be wholly 
sovereign, [and] how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their 
neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new 
techniques for resolving conflicts between themselves.’56   
Despite the weaknesses and criticisms of neo-functionalism,57 it provides some 
explanation of the emergence of institutional structures at the EC level to regulate the 
financial services sector.  Minimum harmonisation is viewed by those who advocate 
European federalism as a transitory stage on the way towards European legal unity.  On 
the other hand, minimum harmonisation has been viewed as a mechanism to preserve 
national autonomy and regulatory competition amongst states.  Although EU federalism 
was initially designed to promote competition between national legal orders, the inter-
governmentalist principles of minimum harmonisation and home country control have 
clearly reached their limit in fostering the development of more efficient regulation of the 
EU financial sector.  Indeed, competition among national regulatory rules cannot be seen 
as an end in itself, but must be evaluated within a broader range of possibilities, such as 
the desirability of transferring power to EU institutions.  To this end, centralising 
regulatory powers is important to avoid a reversion to national regulatory policies that 
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might result in a fragmented and disjointed approach to devising regulation in the internal 
market (Bratton, 1996, p. 36).  The introduction of a EU supervisory authority with 
responsibilities for the investment services industry would have as one of its major 
functions to ensure that rules are applied in the same way in all Member States.   
Neo-functionalists were undoubtedly correct in assuming that the functional needs of 
an integrated European market would necessitate a considerable transfer of policy-
making powers to the EU level (Majone,1996).58  With a single currency and a single 
internal market, Thieffry has noted that the lack of a single regulator could undermine 
financial stability and result in less consumer/investor protection.  Indeed, an important 
reason to delegate the powers to a politically-independent regulator is to enhance the 
credibility of the EU’s long-term policy commitment to create a single financial market.  
Furthermore, certain weaknesses of the existing EU legal framework for regulating 
investment services can be summarised as follows:  the cost of the securities industry 
operating in a fragmented EU market with blurred divisions between home and host 
supervisory powers; slow and fragmented legislative responses to market innovation; 
imperfect information exchange and deficient cooperation between member States 
supervisors; doubtful credibility and independence in existing national regulators; and 
lack of efficient crisis management situations.  Given these weaknesses with the existing 
system, it is necessary to analyse the economic reasons for consolidating securities 
regulation within EC institutions.     
 Critics have argued that the Lamfalussy structure does not provide the 
institutional safeguards of political accountability to the EC Council and Parliament and 
will also create legislative delay and inflexibility in promulgating and implementing 
securities regulation in the Member States.  Although some authors have argued that it is 
necessary to further streamline the institutional structure and the standard-setting process 
so that a Level 2 European Securities Committee can take the initiative in devising 
regulations and rules to implement broader legislative objectives set forth by the 
Commission and Parliament, such further institutional consolidation would require 
stronger economic links in cross-border trade in financial services to justify the 
substantial costs of establishing such a centralised regulatory framework.  Once economic 
convergence and sufficient financial integration has occurred, a more centralised 
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framework that goes beyond the Lamfalussy approach might be more effective in crafting 
uniform regulatory standards and rules that can be applied in an expedited manner 
throughout member state markets.   
It should also be noted that the inter-governmental and neo-functional theories 
will continue to compete to explain the recently established Economic and Financial 
Committee (EFC).  ECOFIN established the EFC to address EU economic and financial 
policies.  It prepares the ECOFIN agenda and makes proposals for revising EU 
supervisory and regulatory frameworks for the internal market.  In October 2002, the 
EFC issued a report that proposed that the Lamfalussy institutional arrangements for 
securities regulation be extended through inter-institutional agreements to other financial 
sectors, such as banking, insurance and financial conglomerates.  These newly-
established committees with four-level frameworks will exercise enhanced comitology 
powers.  An inter-institutional monitoring group has been established to monitor 
communications between these committees. 
Based on the EFC proposal, the Commission will be making a legislative proposal 
along these lines in 2003.  The growing influence of the EFC has caused concerns 
regarding its accountability to the main EC governmental organs, the Commission, the 
Council, the Parliament and the Court of Justice; and as discussed below, it has become a 
crucial policy link in the emerging institutional framework of EU financial regulation. 
 
The Institutional Viability of a Single Regulator  
Ongoing efforts to centralise and consolidate EU securities regulation raises a 
number of critical economic and institutional issues regarding the economic costs and 
benefits of adopting a uniform regulatory regime that applies to all EU countries.  The 
design of such a regime must take account of divergent economic structures in countries 
with vastly different administrative, regulatory and legal regimes.  Some scholars criticise 
the centralisation of regulatory authority in the EU because it may lead to excessive 
concentration of federal powers and over-regulation that might stifle market innovation 
and diminish regulatory competition between member states.  This may lead to a 
disregard of the special characteristics of national markets.59  On the other hand, 
proposals for a single EU securities regulator is a response to fragmentation in financial 
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policymaking and to insufficient cooperation and coordination between member states to 
ensure that EU regulatory policies are implemented and enforced.  The effectiveness of a 
single regulatory regime is premised on the need for a one-size fits all legal framework to 
govern cross-border trade in securities in EU financial markets.  Establishing a single 
regulator with preemptive authority over national regulation is designed to insulate EU 
policymaking from parochial local interests and the institutional interests of other EU 
bodies. 
At a theoretical level, the costs and benefits of creating a single regulator can be 
assessed within the context of both transaction costs and sovereignty costs.  One issue 
that arises concerns whether the reduced transaction costs and coordination benefits 
derived from a more centralised EU regulatory regime, along with reduced compliance 
costs for market participants, offset the sovereignty costs associated with the loss of 
regulatory authority for member states over local securities markets.  The effectiveness of 
a more centralised approach will also depend on the institutional competence of EU 
authorities and their ability to coordinate the implementation and enforcement of 
regulatory policy with member state regulators.  It is not necessary therefore to have a 
single regulator with exclusive responsibility for devising and enforcing EU standards.  
An EU securities regulatory regime can avoid incurring high sovereignty costs and still 
achieve the coordination benefits of reduced transaction costs by adopting an institutional 
framework that relies on effective coordination of standard-setting, implementation and 
enforcement.    
 Although there is attractiveness to the idea that more efficient securities 
regulation can be devised at the EU level, the uniform application of EU securities 
regulation throughout the member states would have a disproportionate impact on the 
economic structures of member states, some of which have significant differences in the 
structure of their financial services industry and in the way they regulate financial 
services.  Indeed, differences in the institutional structure of financial regulation can lead 
to different regulatory objectives and rationales that might be changed alter significant if 
a single regulatory regime and authority were to take primary responsibility for EU 
securities regulation.  Moreover, the centralisation of primary regulatory authority in a 
European Securities Regulator would only work if a prominent role were given to 
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national regulators and supervisors to implement EU policy.  There would still be a 
danger that uniform securites regulation, even if implemented by national authorities 
throughout the EU, would still not accomplish the economic objectives of lowering 
regulatory cost and enhancing economic growth and financial development.  In practice, 
trends in market practice and financial products vary between jurisdictions, though there 
are increasing similarities, and that is why regulation must still rely on national 
supervisors to chart the regulatory field in order to most efficiently implement broader 
EU policy in financial services.   
In addition, most economic analysis of the role of regulation in securities markets 
militates against the adoption of a single EU securities regulatory regime.  Nevertheless, 
the driving forces behind any project to design the institutional structure of a regulator 
will be political.  The Lamfalussy framework has arguably been successful in many of its 
tasks precisely because it has been driven by political forces and respects the sovereign 
authority of states.  Successful development of the Lamfalussy programme would likely 
provide positive spillover effects for the parallel project of implementing the FSAP.  On 
the other hand, a more centralised EU securities regulatory authority would reap 
coordination benefits of collective action as espoused by neo-functionalist theory.  
Moreover, the centralised exercise of regulatory power would lead to lower direct and 
indirect transaction costs.  Further, there would be more flexibility of action than the 
existing Lamfalussy framework.  Arguably, if the regulator is empowered to promulgate, 
repeal, amend, and interpret regulation, then the system should be able to provide the 
right amount of flexibility and efficient rulemaking.    
 
Is the European Union an Optimal Economic Area for Securities Regulation? 
 
There is little doubt that the Lamfalussy process has assisted the political goals of 
European Union and in particular the development of the internal market for capital and 
financial services.  The future development of the Lamfalussy framework, however, 
depends on its ability to help countries reach their economic goals, that is, achieving 
efficient and integrated financial markets.  But the centralisation and consolidation of EU 
standard setting and rulemaking can in principle lead to economic sacrifices as well as 
benefits.  This paper contends that further extension of the Lamfalussy programme into a 
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single EU regulator should only take place if EU financial markets have reached a 
sufficient level of integration.  Establishing a single regulator before that time will entail 
enormous economic costs and misallocation of resources in EU financial markets.  
Advocates of a single regulator and a uniform securities regulatory regime have not given 
adequate consideration to the economic costs of linking all EU states (including accession 
states) to a unified EU securities regulatory regime.  EU capital markets remain 
fragmented and segmented because of various economic, social and cultural factors.  
Moreover, member state legal systems have considerable differences in their definitions 
of property with respect to securities and investment services.  The EU FSAP’s efforts to 
harmonise and liberalise trade in EU financial services will not be sufficient to produce a 
fully integrated EU financial market.  Further changes in market practices, investor 
preferences, and macroeconomic developments will have to take place before a single 
regulator will be able to effectively perform its functions.     
 This section argues that weighing the costs and benefits of establishing a single 
regulator must begin by assessing the extent of integration that exists in EU financial 
markets.  The effectiveness of a single regulator, and indeed a uniform EU securities 
regime that applies in the same way throughout the Union, will depend on how well the 
securities markets of member-state economies are integrated with the securities markets 
of other member states economies.  To conduct this analysis, the paper adopts the model 
of Optimum Currency Areas, derived from Robert Mundell’s classic work, The Theory of 
Optimum Currency Areas,60.which predicts that fixed exchange rates are most 
appropriate for economies that are closely integrated through international trade and 
factor movements.  In securities regulation, this model can be applied to show whether a 
single trans-national regulatory regime is appropriate for economies with varying levels 
of integration in financial and investment services.   
 To apply this model, consider how an individual country, for example, Poland, 
would approach the decision of submitting the regulation of its securities markets to a 
single EU regulator or single regime.  A simple diagram can demonstrate the choices 
faced by Poland (Appendix A).  To demonstrate the benefits and costs for Poland of 
submitting its regulatory authority for securities markets to an EU regime, I derive two 
elements of a diagram, a schedule called BB which shows the potential economic and 
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institutional gains of adopting the EU regime.  The schedule depends on Poland’s trade 
links in financial and investment services with other economies in the EU.   
Poland’s place on the schedule will derive from the benefits it gains from being 
subject to a uniform EU securities regime.  For example, an important benefit would be 
the reduced cost in calculating the various requirements that different countries impose 
on foreign providers of financial services.  By being subject to a uniform regime across 
EU border, Polish financial service traders will derive a more predictable regulatory 
regime from country to country.  In practice, it may be difficult to calculate an exact cost 
savings for this type of benefit.  The gain though will likely be higher if Poland has 
substantial trade links or high levels of financial integration with other EU countries.   
The conclusion should be that a high degree of financial integration between a 
country and a single regulatory area increases the economic gain for the country seeking 
to join.  The higher the level of cross-border trade in financial services and linkages in 
securities markets (ie., multiple listings in different jurisdictions) then the higher the 
efficiency gain the country derives from joining a single regulation area.  In Chart A, the 
upward sloping curve BB shows the relation between a country’s degree of financial 
integration with a single regulation area and the economic efficiency gain from being 
subject to a single regulation area.  Chart A’s horizontal axis measures the extent to 
which Poland is financially integrated with the EU economic area.  The vertical axis 
measures the regulatory efficiency gain for Poland in transferring securities regulatory 
authority to EU institutions.  BB’s positive slope represents the view that the gains from a 
single regulatory regime increase for a country as its financial integration with the EU 
area increases. 
 A theory of optimum regulation areas can provide a framework for assessing 
whether a country or countries will benefit or incur costs by submitting regulatory 
authority over its securities markets to a transnational authority.  Further empirical 
research is necessary to demonstrate a richer picture of the costs and benefits for a 
member state to adopt a uniform single regulatory regime in securities and investment 
services.  The gains and losses experienced by a state is more likely to benefit from 
joining a single regulation area if the economic area in question (ie., the European Union) 
has high levels of financial integration with its own financial markets. 
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 The efficiency gains from joining a single regulation area for securities markets 
equals the joining country’s savings from avoiding the uncertainty, calculation, and 
transaction costs of having to comply with the various regulatory regimes of other 
countries with whom the joining country’s service providers trade.  A country, for 
example, Poland, is more likely to benefit from joining a single regulatory regime if its 
economy is closely integrated with the economies of the other countries subject to the 
single regulatory regime.  For securities markets, the general degree of financial 
integration can be assessed by looking at the integration of financial services markets, 
that is, the extent of trade in investment and financial services between the joining 
country and the countries subject to the single regulatory regime.  The other criteria is the 
degree of integration between factor markets, that is in the case of securities, the extent 
that capital moves between a joining country and the countries of a single regulation area.   
 Recent studies on financial integration in Europe rely on various data that 
measure price and returns on assets and quantity flows and stock61  These studies 
generally show strong home bias for cross-border banking services and differential prices 
and returns on securities listed on different EU exchanges that are explained by aspects 
other than the rate of return and the risk of the investment.  Also, substantially different 
interest rates exist for corporate loans and mortgage loans in different EU states.62  This 
suggests low levels of integration in these financial services.  Moreover, the international 
composition of assets in investment funds that are based in Europe also show strong bias, 
thus suggesting low levels of integration.   
By contrast, the amount of cross-border trade in financial services between the 
States of the United States as a percentage of total US trade in financial services is 
between 50-55%.63  The higher level of integration in US financial markets and in 
particular the high level of cross-border trade in financial services amongst the US states 
suggest that a more centralised federal regulatory regime is appropriate for US securities 
and investment services markets which is supplemented by state laws and regulation.  In 
the case of the European Union, the substantially lower levels of integration justify the 
view that a more centralised and harmonised EU securities regulatory regime is 
inappropriate for EU financial policy.   
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Naturally, more study of the direct and indirect measures of financial integration 
should be undertaken before any conclusions are made regarding levels of integration in 
European financial markets.  Moreover, any final policy conclusions regarding the 
institutional design and scope of securities regulation and the extent of harmonisation of 
EU securities legislation should await these studies.   
  
Conclusion 
Whilst supervisory tasks are often best performed as close as possible to supervised 
entities, increased cross-border and cross-sectoral activities in EU markets require 
institutional arrangements that facilitate information flows, setting high level principles at 
EU level, and coordinated decision-making regarding implementation and enforcement.  
To date, EU securities regulation has relied on strengthened cross-border and cross-sector 
cooperation amongst national authorities.  This can lead to greater convergence in 
regulatory and supervisory practices and promote the single market by enhancing the 
ability of national supervisors to monitor cross-border financial institutions and 
transactions.  These transnational regulatory developments have followed the gradual 
evolution of EU financial markets from highly regulated and segmented markets to 
increasingly liberalised regulatory frameworks that seek to build a truly internal EU 
market for financial services.  An increasingly liberalised framework does not necessarily 
mean an increasingly integrated market.  EU regulatory policy must address not only the 
regulatory and legal instruments for achieving an integrated EU financial market, but also 
the macroeconomic, social and cultural factors that keep financial markets segmented.  
The institutional design and scope of a EU securities regulator must take account of the 
nature of the financial markets it would regulate.  Accordingly, an important factor 
determining the viability of an institutional structure of financial regulation is the nature 
and extent of integration in its financial markets.  The effective discharge of its regulatory 
responsibilities requires that its roles and responsibilities be clearly allocated, that all 
regulatory and supervisory actors be accountable, and its institutional framework is 
suitable for the financial markets it regulates.   
The main argument of this paper refines the latter point somewhat by arguing that the 
institutional design and scope of the financial regulator should depend, in part, on the 
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degree of financial integration in the market it regulates.  This paper argues that an 
important aspect in developing an efficient securities regulatory regime is to ensure that 
the market over which the regulator exercises jurisdiction has achieved a sufficient level 
of market integration.  The degree of market integration is important for determining the 
possible reach of the externality that might arise because of market failure (ie., systemic 
risk).  For instance, the scope of the negative externality arising from the under-pricing of 
risk might easily spread through a sufficiently integrated financial market and threaten 
financial stability.  This should be a major factor influencing the institutional design and 
scope of authority of the regulator.  
Higher economic integration often involves increased similarities in market 
practices between participants in different economies.  Increased links and commonalities 
of practice lend themselves to a more uniform regulatory approach.  In 2003, the degree 
of cross-border trade in financial services between EU member states is low relative to 
the degree of total financial services trade.  This lack of sufficient economic links in the 
financial services sectors of the different member economies suggests that primary 
reliance for standard setting and implementation and enforcement should remain with 
national authorities.  This does not negate the strong role that EU law and regulation can 
play.  Rather, EU law and regulation must be incremental and expand its reach according 
to the increasing links that are growing between member state economies.  When EU 
financial services are truly integrated on a cross-border basis, a stronger case could then 
be made for further consolidation and centralisation in the Lamfaulssy programme and 
perhaps even the establishment of a single regulator. 
It is suggested that, because of its low level of financial integration, the European 
Union may not be an optimum economic area for securities regulation.  The paper argues 
therefore that if levels of integration are in fact low the economic case supporting a 
centralised EU securities regulator is undermined, and that existing efforts under the 
Lamfalussy framework (albeit in need of reform in key areas) are more appropriate given 
the existing level of segmentation in EU financial markets.   
  This paper is the first step in further research that will be undertaken to assess 
the level of integration in EU financial markets and the link between financial market 
integration and the optimal institutional design of financial regulation.         
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